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obtaining the key and random key mask value

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Patents 1 - 10 on **obtaining the key and random key mask value**. (0.09 seconds)

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[Issued patents](#)[Applications](#)[\[APPLICATION\] Security countermeasures for power analysis attacks](#)

US Pat. 10825291 - Filed Apr 16, 2004

plaintext **value** using a look up on a table, the method comprising the following steps; a) **obtaining the key** and a **random value** r; b) **obtaining** a set of n ...[Method of using a **mask** programmed **key** to securely configure a field ...](#)

US Pat. 7240218 - Filed Feb 8, 2001 - Algotronix, Ltd.

The use of cipher block chaining and a **random** initial **value** makes cryptanalysis based ... Attack 6 is probably the most cost effective way of **obtaining key** ...[\[APPLICATION\] Encryption secured against DPA](#)

US Pat. 10028265 - Filed Dec 28, 2001 - FUJITSU LIMITED

... thereby **obtain** effects similar to the conventional **random mask value** method, while the conventional method **masks** an input or a **key** using **random values**. ...[\[APPLICATION\] **Key** masking for cryptographic processes](#)

US Pat. 11128206 - Filed May 13, 2005 - Research In Motion Limited

... **key value** into a set of split **key values**, b) defining a set of **random mask values**, c) combining multiple **random mask values** to define non-uniform **key** ...[\[APPLICATION\] Secure caching technique for shared distributed caches](#)

US Pat. 11347860 - Filed Feb 6, 2006 - International Business Machines Corporation

In step S6, the encrypted **mask value** M is decrypted using the secret **key** SK. ...[0032] In step S34, a **random mask value** M is generated and retained, ...[\[APPLICATION\] **Key** agreement system, shared-**key** generation apparatus, and shared-**key** ...](#)

US Pat. 10725102 - Filed Dec 2, 2003

[0538] Next, the shared-**key** encryption unit 118 receives a plurality of plaintexts m_i ($1 \leq i \leq n$) from a ... [0544] The **random**-number **mask** removal unit ...[\[APPLICATION\] Access control apparatus, access control system, processor, access control ...](#)

US Pat. 11523003 - Filed Sep 19, 2006


For example, a **value** generated from the cryptic **key** by using a hash function can be used as ... the **value** of the **random** number for **mask** is superposed by an ...[Method and system for providing secure **key** distribution in a communication ...](#)

US Pat. 5729608 - Filed Jan 24, 1996 - International Business Machines Corp.

A **key** being distributed must be a **random**, unpredictable quantity. ... The adversary can try to **obtain** the **MASK value** by interrogating B and pretending to be ...[Digital radio transceiver with encrypted **key** storage](#)

US Pat. 5481610 - Filed Feb 28, 1994 - Ericsson Inc.

13 14 **value** is transferred to the radio microcomputer 58 via **key** load cable 102 (block 208). ... 58 to re-randomize the **random value** stored within table 78. ...



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